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Abstract. Preparation for potential threats is one of the most important phases ensuring system security. It allows evaluating 
possible losses, changes in the attack process, the effectiveness of used countermeasures, optimal system settings, etc. In cyber-
attack cases, executing real experiments can be difficult for many reasons. However, mathematical or programming models 
can be used instead of conducting experiments in a real environment. This work proposes a composite denial of service attack 
model that combines bandwidth exhaustion, filtering and memory depletion models for a more real representation of similar 
cyber-attacks. On the basis of the introduced model, different experiments were done. They showed the main dependencies of 
the influence of attacker and victim’s properties on the success probability of denial of service attack. In the future, this model 
can be used for the denial of service attack or countermeasure optimization.
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Introduction
The Internet becomes a quite important part of daily life 
and gives us an opportunity to easily and quickly get the 
newest and necessary information. However, an increase in 
the need of particular Internet services makes its quality and 
availability very important and sometimes even a critical 
factor for proper company’s operation.
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks is a type of cyber-
attacks aimed at disturbing or denying the Internet services, 
thus making difficult usage of it by its legitimate users. 
According to CERT-LT, in 2010, Denial of Service attacks 
were in the 4th place considering the frequency of occurren-
ce in Lithuania. The office of the State Chief Information 
Security Officer (State of Texas) in the United States of 
America accepted that DDoS attacks as a way to make 
ransom attacks would also be one of the most popular at-
tacks in the future.
Depending on a situation, DoS attacks can cause huge 
damage and loses. It can be quite difficult to prepare for 
similar attacks, because of insufficient ways or methods for 
estimating attack success. The aim of this work is to suggest 
a composite DoS attack model and use it for the analysis of 
how different properties of the attack and victim influence 
the overall attack success probability.
The coming sections of this paper describe why model-
ling DDoS attacks is a better solution than real experiments. 
Most common model types used for DoS attack modelling 
are mentioned to show why we suggest using mathematical 
models and what models have already been proposed to be 
used for modelling different types of DoS attacks.
The following sections represent the ideas and calcu-
lations of the above proposed composite DoS attack model 
used for modelling different DDoS attack situations and for 
distinguishing the impact of attack and victim properties 
on the success probability of composite attack. The results 
of the performed experiments and imposed conditions are 
also represented.
Denial of Service Attacks and Models
In the denial-of-service attack, the attacker attempts to pre-
vent legitimate users from accessing information or servi-
ces. By targeting your computer and its network con nection 
or the computers and network of the sites you are trying to 
use, the attacker may be able to prevent you from an acces-
sing email, websites, online accounts or other services that 
rely on the affected computer (McDowell 2004). In order to 
increase the attack power, many controlled computers can 
be used. This kind of attack is also known as a Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) attack.
Practical experiments with DoS and DDoS attacks are 
difficult because of the following reasons:
− the area of attack sources spreads in a wide geo-
graphical area and experiments in the local network 
can be insufficient to illustrate the real situation;
− DDoS attacks require plenty of controlled computers, 
and therefore make difficulties in getting a sufficient 
amount of infected and ready to attack computers;
− execution of the DoS attack on the Internet can be 
illegal;
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− real experiments on the Internet can cause problems 
for the third parties, disturb the work of innocent 
Internet users or even services.
The examination of attack properties without the real 
execution of DoS attacks can be done using different mo-
delling methods and tools. Modelling allows making the 
estimation of the influence of different attack properties 
with less time and resource supplies.
For DoS and DDoS attack modelling different met-
hods is used. C. Meadows (1999) proposed a cost-based 
framework useful to analyse protocol resistance to DoS 
attacks. The framework was used for researching diffe-
rent protocols (Meadows 2011; Diffie et al. 1992; Gong, 
Syverson 1995; Lafrance, Mullins 2003; Smith et al. 2006; 
Aiello et al. 2004; Cao et al. 2007). While this type of the 
model did not represent two confronting sides (attacked and 
victim), the other type of the multi-agent based DoS attack 
model - game-based model - was proposed by B. Bencsath 
et al. (2003). This type of models was used for computer 
science (Shenker 1994; Altman 1994; Maheswaran, Basar 
1998; Hespanha, Bohacek 2001; Lye, Wing 2002) whi-
le B. Bencsath started using it for DoS attack modelling. 
The idea of game-based models in DoS attack modelling 
was developed by M. Fallah (2010) and I. Kotenko (2005). 
However, game-based models were not meant to represent 
the dynamics of object changes. Thus, rewrite theory mo-
dels found a place in agent based DoS attack modelling 
and some researches were done using it (Agha et al. 2005; 
AlTurki et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2007).
These models relay on programming approaches 
(simulation, multi agent, rule-based models). However, 
the existing mathematical DoS and DDoS models can be 
used separately or combined with programming to produce 
model results without long lasting simulation or model 
execution. Those models are more dependent on a type of 
the DoS attack and use an appropriate queuing theory sys-
tem for a certain situation. Q. Huang (Huang et al. 2003a, 
2003b) and R. K. Chang (2002) applied general arrival rate 
to model DoS attacks. S. Khan, I. Traore (2005), A. Aissani 
(2008), G. Macia-Fernandez (Macia-Fernandez et al. 2006, 
2009) and N. Chaturvedi, H. Mohant (2011) employed ex-
ponential distribution (Poisson process) to represent a cer-
tain level of traffic randomness in incoming traffic.
According to many different researches (Puigjaner 
2006; Jain, Routhier 1986; Leland et al. 1994; Vandalore 
et al. 1999; Paxson, Floyd 1995), the present Erlang models 
do not represent the Internet traffic precisely and can be used 
only at a session level. Meanwhile, for model composition, 
burst and packet levels require more detailed traffic activity 
states and their intrinsic characteristics analysis. Therefore, 
Y. Wang et al. (2007) and K. Salah (2010) propose to model 
DoS attacks in a more general form and use Markov chains. 
It allows representing transitions from one state to another 
in a more detailed way. However, to describe a DoS attack 
in detail using Markov chain sometimes can be challenging 
and bring more complexity to model execution.
We believe that usually DoS and DDoS attacks can 
be modelled at the session rather than at the package level. 
Therefore, mathematical models of Poisson process with 
arrival rate is one of the most appropriate solutions taking 
into account both a model adequate to a certain situation 
and computation resources. However, as mentioned before, 
these models can vary depending on DoS type.
Mathematical Models of Bandwidth Exhaustion 
DoS Attack
A bandwidth exhaustion DoS attack happens when an intru-
der consumes all available bandwidth on a certain network 
by generating a large number of packets directed to your 
network. Typically, these packets are ICMP ECHO packets 
but in principle they may be anything (CERT 2001).
Q. Huang, H. Kobayashi and B. Liu suggested two 
models for modelling bandwidth exhaustion DoS attacks: 
one is for the attacks in the global network (Huang 2003a), 
and the other is for wireless networks (Huang 2003b). These 
two models offer the methods allowing finding a minimal 
number of agents necessary to execute successful DDoS 
attacks; however, the models do not pay enough attention 
to the properties of all attacks. More attack properties are 
taken into account in the paper focusing on modelling DoS 
attacks using stochastic methods (Ramanauskaitė, Čenys 
2009). Also, this paper represents a mathematical expres-
sion of calculating the success of DoS attack using the 
known data on the attacks, normal flow and other properties 
of the victim.
Mathematical Models of Memory Exhaustion 
DoS Attack
DoS resource depletion attacks involve the attacker sending 
packets that misuse network protocol communications or 
sending malformed packets that tie up network resources so 
that none are left for legitimate users (Specht, Lee 2004). 
Memory is usually exhausted, and thus no new queries can 
be stored and served.
Memory depletion DoS attacks are the most common 
because of noticeable effect and quite low attack expenses. 
This is why there is a quite big range of the proposed mo-
dels for memory depletion DoS attacks:
− Q. Huang et al. (2003a) apply the simplified 
Engest loss model G(N)/G/m(0) that enables to 
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estimate the success of the SYN flooding attack 
when average attack flow, the average storage 
time of open-state connections and buffer size are 
known. However, these authors do not consider 
legitimate users, so there are no characteristics of 
legitimate users in this model and only the attack 
itself is characterised;
− R. K. C. Chang (2002) uses G/D/∞/N model to 
calculate minimal attack flow necessary to make 
a successful TCP SYN attack. However, in this 
work, the model is not described in detail, and 
only the results of the conducted experiment are 
given. Therefore, no possibility of making a con-
clusion concerning the comprehensiveness of this 
model exists.
− Y. Wang et al. (2007) use the model of two-dimen-
sional embedded Markov chain taking into account 
legitimate and attack flow characteristics and buffer 
size. Nevertheless, this model is difficult to use in 
practice because of complex calculations.
− S. Ramanauskaitė (2010) suggests the SYN floo-
ding attack model that can be used for any kind of 
memory depletion DoS attacks and allows estima-
ting the success probability of the attack conside-
ring both victim and attacker properties.
Composite DoS Attack Model
Bandwidth exhaustion and memory depletion models allow 
analysing only certain parts of the overall DoS or DDoS 
attack. The real situation usually involves the interaction 
between different types of attacks. Therefore, the re lations 
of DoS attacks should be taken into account and DoS attack 
models should be represented using a combined model 
involving at least a few types of the DoS attack.
When analyzing the DoS attack, we allow for accounts 
both bandwidth and memory depletion DoS models as well 
as for the filtering properties of the system. The concept 
of this composite model is explained in Fig. 1 or this way: 
incoming traffic can be blocked because of insufficient 
bandwidth. The rest part of traffic can be blocked by the 
filtering system. Finally, everything left after filtering can 
be blocked by an insufficient place in the buffer devoted 
to store open connections.
We denote bandwidth exhaustion probability as PB, 
the probability of filtering legitimate traffic as PFn and me-
mory depletion probability as PM. Composite attack pro-
bability P can be calculated as the probability of blocking 
legitimate traffic at least in one of these three subsystems 
(bandwidth exhaustion, filtering or memory depletion):
 B Fn M1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )P P P P= − − ⋅ − ⋅ − . (1)
For estimating bandwidth exhaustion probability 














where ( ) ( )Ba Bn a Ba n Bns s T l l Tρ = + = ⋅λ + ⋅λ ; k – the 
number of open channels; sBa – attack traffic (bps); 
sBn – normal traffic (bps); T – channel bandwidth (bps); 
la – the average query size of the attack (b); ln – the aver-
age query size of legitimate users (b); λBa – an arrival rate 
Fig. 1. A model of a conceptual composite DoS attack
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of attack queries (qps); λBn – an arrival rate of legitimate 
user queries (qps).
We assume that the filtering system has two proper-
ties: the probability of filtering legitimate traffic PFn and 
the probability of filtering attack traffic PFa. These proper-
ties show the part of legitimate and attack traffics that are 
blocked on average using filters.
To estimate incoming traffic, these properties are im-
portant both to composite attack probability and a subsystem 
of memory depletion. Considering the bandwidth exhaustion 
model, we assume that both legitimate and attack traffic has 
the same distribution in time as the overall incoming data. 
After passing the bandwidth exhaustion model, the rate of 
incoming traffic will be reduced to λFa and λFn:
 Fa Ba B(1 )Pλ = λ ⋅ − , (3)
 Fn Bn B(1 )Pλ = λ ⋅ − . (4)
The filtering system should block traffic equally consi-
dering time; thus, incoming legitimate traffic λMa and attack 
traffic λMn should change in size but not in its distribution. 
The extent to which traffic size will be reduced depends on 
filtering properties PFa and PFn:
 Ma Fa Fa(1 )Pλ = λ ⋅ − , (5)
 Mn Fn Fn(1 )Pλ = λ ⋅ − . (6)
The third subsystem of this composite DoS attack 
model is the memory depletion model. To represent this 
kind of the DoS attack, we use the SYN flooding attack 
model (Ramanauskaitė 2010) that might be also used for 
more general DoS attack types (for all DoS attacks based 













where Ma a Mn nt tσ = λ ⋅ + λ ⋅ ; M – buffer size; ta – the ave-
rage processing time of the attack query (s); tn – the average 
processing time of the legitimate query (s).
Modelling Results
Using the proposed model of the composite DoS attack, 
different situations were examined. The purpose of these 
experiments was to distinguish the influence of different 
attack properties on the success of the DoS attack.
For the analysis of these experiments, standard si-
tuation parameters may be chosen:
− regular 20 Mbps traffic (100 queries per second by 
200 bits in each);
− 10 Mbps attack traffic (50000 queries per second 
by 200 bits in each);
− 1 channel with 100 Mbps bandwidth;
− victim uses filters that filter 20% of the attack and 
2% of legitimate users queries;
− legitimate query takes 200 ms to execute;
− attack query execution takes 2 000 ms;
− buffer can hold information of 50 connections.
These attack and victim parameters lead to 8.7% of 
bandwidth exhaustion. 2% of legitimate queries are bloc-
ked by filtering system and memory depletion probability 
is 39.3%. The success probability of the composite DoS 
attack is 45.7%.
Changing filtering properties brings clarity that the 
blocking probability of legitimate queries is very impor-
tant and linearly increases the success probability of the 
composite DoS attack. Meanwhile, the percentage of filte-
ring attack traffic influences the memory and probability 
of the composite DoS attack to change in a not linear way 
(Fig. 2a).
Fig. 2. The dependency of attack success on the percentage of filtering the attack query (a); attack query service time (b)
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reason for the high success probability of the com-
posite attack;
− changes in the DoS attack and victim property va-
lues has not a linear influence on different parts 
of attack success probability not mentioning the 
success probability of the composite DoS attack.
The proposed composite DoS attack model can be 
improved adding additional components to a successful 
DoS attack such as computer processing power depletion 
subsystem or global filtering options. However, the sug-
gested model can be used for evaluating the basic success 
probability of the DoS attack or different attack properties 
having influence on it.
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JungTInIS DoS AtAKų MoDElIS
S. Ramanauskaitė, A. Čenys
Santrauka
Siekiant užkirsti kelią bet kokioms sistemų saugumo grėsmėms, 
vienas iš svarbiausių uždavinių yra prevencija. Tai leidžia nu-
matyti galimus pavojus ir kovos su jais būdus, nustatyti jų 
efektyvumą ir pan. Tačiau realiai eksperimentuoti su turima sis-
tema dažnai gali būti pernelyg sudėtinga, todėl daug lengviau šią 
problemą spręsti padeda matematiniai / programiniai modeliai. 
Straipsnyje siūlomas naujas DoS atakų modelis, sujungiantis 
kelių tipų DoS atakas (srauto ir atminties išnaudojimo, netinkamo 
filtrų nustatymo) ir jų įtaką viena kitai. Remiantis šiuo naujai 
sukurtu modeliu atlikti eksperimentai, kurių metu vertinama 
skirtingų atakos ir aukos savybių reikšmių įtaka bendrai atakos 
sėkmės tikimybei.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: elektroninės paslaugos trikdymo ataka, 
modelis, DoS, DDoS.
